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Gillis: Lender Liability: Determining the Scope of the CERCLA Secured Cre

LENDER LIABILITY: DETERMINING THE SCOPE
OF THE CERCLA SECURED CREDITOR EXEMPTION
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550
(11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 952 (1991)
Appellee, the United States government, filed suit against appellant, Fleet Factors Corporation,1 under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).2 Appelee sought to recover approximately $400,000 of costs that it had
incurred in cleaning up hazardous waste s on property in which appel-

1. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955, 959 (S.D. Ga. 1988), affd 901
F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 952 (1991). Fleet Factors is a lender which
engages in "factoring" agreements. Id. at 957. Under a factoring agreement, a lender agrees
to advance funds to a borrower against the assignment of the borrower's accounts receivable.
C. JOHNSON, W. MEIGO & A. MOSICH, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 270 (1978). The lender

typically will loan only a certain percentage of the face value of the receivables, in order to
protect itself in the event that some of the receivables prove to be uncollectible. Id. In the
instant case, Fleet Factors and the borrower agreed that Fleet Factors would receive an assignment of accounts receivable; a security interest in all of the borrower's equipment, inventory,
and fixtures; and a mortgage on the borrower's real property. FleetFactors, 724 F. Supp. at 957.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988) [hereinafter CERCLA].
3. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S.Ct. 952 (1991). This comment uses the terms "hazardous waste" and "hazardous substance"
interchangeably to refer to "hazardous substance," as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988),
which provides:
The term "hazardous substance" means (A) any substance designated pursuant
to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of title 33 [the Federal Water Pollution Control Act], (B)
any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to
section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42
U.S.C. 6921] (but not including any waste the regulation of which under the Solid
Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.] has been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any
hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.
7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect
to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15.
The term does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof
which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance
under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not
include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquified natural gas, or synthetic gas
usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
Id.
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lant held a security interest. 4 Appellant moved for summary judgment. 5 The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, and
sua sponte certified the issues for interlocutory appeal.6 The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals HELD, that appellant's efforts to protect
its security interest in the facility may have risen to a level of management participation sufficient to impose liability under CERCLA, there7
fore precluding summary judgment on the issue.
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 in response to the growing
problem of improper disposal of hazardous waste s CERCLA authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to clean up improperly disposed hazardous wastes. 9 CERCLA also imposes liability
on various partieslo associated with the hazardous waste site in order
to recover the "response" costs attributable to the clean up.1 However,

4. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1553.
5. Id. at 1552.
6. Id. at 1553.
7. Id. at 1552; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988) for the text of CERCLA.
8. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,995 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 4, 1985). See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980) (for legislative history of
CERCLA).
9. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(24), 9604 (1988); Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20.995.
10. The relevant portions of CERCLA provide:
(a) Covered persons; scope; ...
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the
defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section (1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
. . . shall be liable for (A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government. .... ;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan;
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(2), (4).
11. CERCLA defines "response" costs as removal and remedial action costs. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(25) (1988). A removal action is a short term action taken to minimize pollution damage.
See id. § 9601(23). In a removal action, the EPA is authorized to act with any steps "necessary
to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment."
Id. A remedial action is a long range action, consistent with a permanent remedy, to reduce
or prevent the release of hazardous substances so they do not spread to cause substantial danger
to public health or welfare or the environment. Id. § 9601(24). The costs of cleanup are financed
by the Hazardous Substance Superfund. I.R.C. § 9507 (1988). After cleanup, the Superfund is
reimbursed through suits against parties connected with the hazardous waste disposal. I.R.C.
§ 9507(b)(2) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). See also United States v. Maryland Bank &
Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund to
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CERCLA contains an exemption for secured creditors.12 The extent
of this exemption increasingly has become the subject of litigation.'i
The litigious nature of this issue primarily is due to the potentially
enormous costs of hazardous waste site cleanup. 14 Based upon the

which the court refers was repealed effective Jan. 1, 1987. However the Superfund currently
in effect is treated as a continuation of the previous trust fund; therefore, the court's analysis
remains valid); Comment, The Liability ofFinancialInstitutionsfor Hazardous Waste Cleanup
Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 WIs. L. Rnv. 139, 149-50 (discussing the procedural aspects of
the Superfund).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988) provides:
The term "owner or operator" means... (ii) in the case of an onshore facility
Such term does not include
... any person owning or operating such facility ....
a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility,
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel
or facility.
Id.
13. See, e.g., Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d 1550; Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp.
573; Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,994.
14. See Comment, supra note 11, at 140. The EPA has proposed rules to interpret the
secured creditor exemption as it applies to lenders and to private or governmental loan guarantors
or successors-in-interest. See E.P.A. Draft ProposalDefining Lender Liability Issues Under
the Secured CreditorExemption of CERCLA, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1162 (proposed Sept. 14,
1990). A private successor-in-interest, as defined by the proposed rule, is a "subsequent bona
fide purchaser of the loan (security interest) in the secondary market." Id. at 1163. A governmental successor-in-interest is defined as a "governmental entity that acquired property involuntarily
or by operation of statute through failure, dissolution, or other insolvency of a lending institution." Id.
The EPA proposed rule provides:
Consistent with the exemption, the secured creditor may act to protect the
interest by policing the loan, by undertaking financial workout with a borrower
where the security interest is threatened, and by foreclosing and expeditiously
liquidating the assets securing the loan. In general, such actions are not considered
to be participation in the management of a facility provided that the actions taken
are necessary to protect the security interest.
Accordingly, a secured party is considered to be acting within the scope of the
exemption if it regularly or periodically monitors the borrower's business, requires
or conducts onsite inspections and audits, requires certification of financial information or compliance with applicable duties, laws or -regulations, or requires other
similar actions, provided that the borrower remains substantially in possession and
control of the operations of the facility...
Foreclosure, purchase at foreclosure sale, acquisition or assignment of title in lieu
of foreclosure, acquisition of a right to title, or other agreement in settlement of
the loan obligation, or any other formal or informal manner by which the lender
acquires possession for disposition of the borrower's collateral, are generally considered to be actions within the scope of the statutory exemption as necessary to
protect the security interest. However, the lender's temporary acquisition must
be reasonably necessary to ensure satisfaction or performance of the loan obligation.
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difficulty courts have had in determining the intended scope of the
secured creditor exemption, a divergence in the case law addressing
15
this issue has emerged.
One of the earliest cases addressing the extent of the secured
creditor exemption is United States v. Mirabile.16 In Mirabile, the
United States filed suit under CERCLA against certain landowners
to recover costs incurred in the removal of hazardous wastes from
their property.17 The landowners joined as third party defendants two
financial institutions which held mortgages on the subject property. 18
The financial institutions counterclaimed against the United States,
alleging that the Small Business Administration (SBA), also a secured
creditor, took part in the creation of the hazardous conditions. 19 The
defendant financial institutions and the SBA moved for summary judg20
ment.
Addressing the motion for summary judgment, the Mirabile court
recognized that ruling on the motions would require it to determine
the circumstances under which a secured creditor would incur
CERCLA liability. 2' The court held that a secured creditor was exempt
from CERCLA liability unless it actively participated in 'the nuts-andbolts, day-to-day production aspects of the business," as opposed to
The lender's actions in outbidding or refusing bids from parties offering fair consideration of the property are evidence that the property is no longer being held
primarily to protect the security interest. To remain within the exemption after
foreclosure, the foreclosing entity must be acting to preserve the assets of the
facility for its subsequent sale at the earliest possible time.
Id. at 1164-65. The proposed EPA rule on its face conflicts with the instant case and with
Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573; see infra notes 33-39, 53-55 and accompanying
text. The EPA proposed its latest draft rule to limit lender liability under CERCLA on June
5, 1991. EPA Proposalto Limit Liability of FinancialInstitutions under CERCLA, 56 BNA's
BANKING REPORT 1108 (proposed June 5, 1991). This proposed rule clarifies the definition of
"indicia of ownership," and discusses liability of a lender before and after foreclosure. Id. at
1112-13. The rule also enunciates particular actions which would constitute "participation in the
management" sufficient to create lender liability. Id. at 1113-20. See generally Braff, The Lender
as Environmental Policeman: Comment of EPA's Draft Lender Liability Rules, 56 BNA's
BANKING REPORT 969 (1991) (critiquing the EPA's draft rules on lender liability).
15. Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous
Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1261, 1274 (1987).
16. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
17. Id. at 20,994.
18. Id. at 20,995.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 20,994-95.
21. Id. at 20,995.
22. Id. at 20,995-96. Additionally, the Mirabile court held that defendant ABT's acquisition
of title to the property at a foreclosure sale was irrelevant because such action was clearly
taken by ABT to protect its security interest in the property. Id. at 20,996.
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only the financial aspects of management. The court reasoned that
Congress intended to create secured creditor liability on the basis of
operational, rather than financial, involvement.m On the basis of this
distinction, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the SBA
and one of the financial institutions.Y
One year after the Mirabile decision, the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland considered the same issue in United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.25 However, the Maryland
Bank & Trust Co. court differed from Mirabile regarding the type of
actions which would trigger secured creditor liability.0s In Maryland
Bank & Trust Co., the defendant previously had held a mortgage on
a parcel of land which the owners had used as a hazardous waste
dump site.2 After the debtor defaulted on the mortgage,2 the defendant foreclosed on the property, ultimately purchasing it at a foreclosure sale.2
Approximately eighteen months later, the EPA initiated cleanup
actions at the site. 0 Thereafter, the agency brought a CERCLA action
against the defendant as owner and operator of the site.3 1 The defenliability because it was a
dant claimed it was exempt from CERCLA
2
former mortgagee of the property.
In response to the defendant's claim, the Maryland Bank & Trust
Co. court held that the secured creditor exemption covered only those
parties who at the time of the EPA's response action held "indicia of
ownership" for the purpose of protecting a then-existing security
interest.4 The Maryland Bank & Trust Co. court reasoned that an

23. Id. at 20,995-96.
24. Id. at 20,996-97. The Mirabile court denied Mellon Bank's motion for summary judgment
based on a finding that the extent of Mellon Bank's involvement with the management of the
facility was an issue of material fact. Id. at 20,997. The loan officer participated in an advisory
board, monitored accounts, and visited the facility approximately once a week. Id. The court
stated that a clearer picture of the officer's involvement in management was necessary to)
determine if his activities placed the creditor outside the secured creditor exemption. Id.
25. 632 F. Supp 573 (D. Md. 1986).
26. See id. at 578.
27. Id. at 575.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 576.
32. Id. at 577.
33. Id. at 578. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
34. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 579. The court found the verb tense in
the phrase, "holds indicia of ownership," critical to its interpretation of the subsection. Id.
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exemption from liability for lenders who purchased at a foreclosure
sale would convert CERCLA into "an insurance scheme" for lenders.Under such a rule, the court postulated that lenders could purchase
polluted property cheaply at foreclosure sales, pay none of the government's cleanup cost, and sell the unpolluted property at its increased
value.3 6 To avoid this result, the court held that lenders who purchase
property should be liable to the same extent as other purchasers at
a foreclosure sale.? The court found the defendant was not entitled
to the secured creditor exemption.3 Therefore, the court held that
the defendant was liable under CERCLA as an "owner and operator"
of the facility.3 9
In Guidice v. BFG Electroplating& ManufacturingCo.,40 the court
adopted elements of the decisions in both Mirabile and Maryland
Bank & Trust Co.41 The Guidice court determined a secured creditor's
liability under CERCLA by distinguishing between two time frames:
one, the period prior to foreclosure and purchase of a foreclosure sale,
and, two, the period after the defendant's purchase of the property
at the foreclosure sale. 42 The Guidice court held that prior to foreclosure and purchase, the Mirabile standard requiring involvement in
the facility's daily operations was the appropriate test of liability.43
Under this standard, a creditor could provide financial management
advice without exposing itself to CERCLA liability, provided that it
was not involved in the daily operations of the facility." In support
of its conclusion, the court reasoned that a high liability threshold
would encourage mortgagees to monitor a mortgagor's use of the prop45
erty.
The Guidice court held that the MarylandBank & Trust Co. rule
should apply during the second time frame, which the Guidice court

35. Id. at 580.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 579.
38. Id.
39. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
40. 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
41. Id. at 562-63.
42. Id. at 561.
43. Id. at 561-62.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 562. Implicitly, the court reasoned that the lender would not fear exposing itself
to liability through this type of involvement. See id. Banks would be protecting their investments
and CERCLA goals would be advanced. Id. Conversely, the court believed a low threshold of
liability would discourage involvement by lenders, and would eliminate a valuable monitoring
tool. Id.
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designated as the period after a creditor's purchase of property at a
foreclosure sale. 46 The Guidice court found that Congress did not intend47
to exempt creditors who acquired property through foreclosure.
Therefore, the Guidice court followed Maryland Bank & Trust Co.
holding that a lender who purchased property at a foreclosure sale
should be liable to the same extent as any other potential purchaser
at the sale.4
The instant case involved the first appellate interpretation 49 of the
CERCLA secured creditor exemption.5 The instant court explicitly
rejected 5' the lower court's acceptance of the Mirabile court's interpretation of the exemption. 2 Rather, the instant court stated that it
would not require a secured creditor to be involved in a facility's daily
operations to be liable under CERCLA. Instead, the court augmented
the CERCLA liability analysis to include consideration of the lender's4
degree of involvement with the property's financial management.
Under this test, a secured creditor is liable if its involvement with
the facility's financial management is sufficient to support the inference
that the creditor could influence decisions relating to hazardous waste
disposal. 5
In fashioning its own test for secured creditor liability, the instant
court found the Mirabile standard too lenient toward creditors with
loans secured by hazardous waste sites.5 The instant court stated that
under such a broad interpretation of the exemption a creditor only
would be exposed to CERCLA liability if it was involved with a
facility's daily operations.5 7 This requirement, according to the instant

46. Id. at 563. The Guidice court specifically rejected the Mirabile court's holding that
foreclosure and repurchase are only attempts to protect the creditor's investment and therefore
do not remove the creditor from the scope of the exemption. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
49. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1556.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). See supra note 12 for the text of this statute.
51. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558.
52. Fleet Factors, 724 F. Supp. at 960.
53. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557.
54. Id. at 1558.
55. Id. In In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit
declined the opportunity to establish a rule on the issue of how much control over a facility a
secured creditor can exert before it will be liable for cleanup. Id. at 672. The court found that
there had been no actual management of the facility by the creditor, and therefore declined to
rule on the issue unnecessarily. Id.
56. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557.
57. Id.
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court, was contrary to the plain meaning of the exemption. 8 The
instant court emphasized that the statutory language demonstrated
that Congress intended to impose liability on secured creditors if they
participated in management.5 9 The instant court also found support
for its narrow construction of the exemption in the legislative history
of CERCLA. Therefore, based upon its interpretation of CERCLA
and its history, the instant court concluded that a stricter standard
was more congruent with congressional intent than was the Mirabile
standard.61
Because the issue was not presented on appeal, the instant court
specifically did not address whether a creditor's purchase of property
at a foreclosure sale automatically would remove the creditor from
the scope of the exemption.62 However, the instant court cited without
disagreement the lower court's holding that because appellant had not
foreclosed on its security interest, it could not be held liable under
CERCLA section 9607(a)(1) as an owner of the facility.The instant court affirmed that its ruling would "give lenders some
latitude in their dealings with debtors without exposing themselves
to potential liability."- The instant court explained that its holding
would not create disincentives for creditors to lend to businesses which
could be involved with hazardous substances.- Rather, the instant
court stated that its decision would encourage lenders to thoroughly
investigate the waste management and disposal practices of potential
borrowers.- The instant court reasoned that if CERCLA liability ap-

58.
59.
60.
WORKS,

Id.
Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii).
Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558 n.11 (citing 2

97th Congress, 2d Sess., 2 A

SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T AND PUBLIC

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE

CERCLA 945 (Comm.

Print 1983) (remarks of Rep. Harsha)). The court found that the original version of CERCLA
proposed by the Senate did not contain an exemption for secured creditors. Id. After revision
of CERCLA, the exemption was introduced because Congress believed it was necessary to
protect 'those who hold title to a . . . facility, but do not participate in the management or
operation and are not otherwise affiliated with the person leasing or operating the ... facility."
Id. The court stated that, in using the word "affiliated" to describe the relationship between
the secured creditor and the operator of the facility, Congress intended to require a lesser
degree of involvement to establish secured creditor liability than the involvement necessary to
establish operator liability. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 1552-53, 1555.
63. Id. at 1555.
64. Id. at 1558.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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peared likely, lenders would factor this added risk into the terms of
the loan agreement.6 7 Therefore, the court suggested its ruling would
provide lenders incentive to monitor their debtors.6
In addition to encouraging lenders to investigate, the instant court
asserted that its test also encouraged lenders to insist on one, debtor
compliance with acceptableewaste treatment standards, and two, submission to periodic environmental audits, as conditions of a continued
financial relationship.6 9 Finally, the court acknowledged that its standard may impede the innocent borrower's ability to obtain financing. 70
However, the court concluded that this risk was consistent with what
it found to be the CERCLA goal of spreading the costs of hazardous
waste disposal throughout the industry. 71
The instant court was faced with a choice between three existing
interpretations of the secured creditor exemption. Under the Mirabile
interpretation, a secured creditor cannot be held liable under CERCLA
unless it was involved in the daily operations of a debtor business. 72
Therefore, the creditor's purchase of the property at a foreclosure
sale does not by itself remove the creditor from the scope of the
exemption and automatically establish liability.7 Under the Maryland
Bank & Trust Co. interpretation of the exemption, the creditor's purchase of the property at a foreclosure sale definitely removes a creditor
from the scope of the exemption. 74 However, the type of conduct which
would create liability prior to the creditor's purchase of the property
in a foreclosure sale is unclear.
Finally, under the Guidice interpretation, a creditor who did not
foreclose and purchase the property is not liable unless it participated
in the daily operations of the business. 75 However, under this interpretation a creditor that purchased the property during foreclosure is
undoubtedly liable. 76 The instant court chose to adopt a narrower
standard than any of these prior decisions. The instant court held that
financial involvement alone, without operational involvement, could

67.
against
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. The court also quoted a suggestion that lenders obtain warranties from borrowers
CERCLA liability. Id. at 1559 n.12 (quoting Note, supra note 15, at 1294).
Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558.
Id.
Id. at 1559 n.12.
Id.
Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996.
See id.
Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 579.
Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 561.
Id. at 563.
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remove a lender from the secured creditor exemption.- In addition,
the instant court implied that the purchase of the property at foreclosure would automatically create secured creditor liability.7By adopting a narrow interpretation of the secured creditor exemption, the instant court in essence has rendered the exemption meaningless. Under the rules of the instant court, a lender's mere financial
involvement to protect its interests may create lender liability for
clean up costs far in excess of the mortgage's balance. In addition,
the instant court's decision actually may thwart the policy objectives
the instant court purported to further. 79 Instead of increasing the
monitoring of hazardous waste facilities by creditors, the instant decision may prompt lenders to distance themselves from businesses involving hazardous substances2o Lenders may fear creating the inference that they could influence waste disposal practices, thereby becoming liable under CERCLA. 81 Thus, the valuable policing of hazardous
waste facilities by lenders, which would exist under a broader interpretation of the exemption, is lost under the instant court's narrow interpretation. s2
In addition, the instant decision has potentially extensive ramifications in the financial services industry. While it would be impossible
for a lender to avoid contact with every type of business which generates hazardous substances, under the instant court's rule most lenders probably will eliminate many industries as potential borrowers.3
The potential lender liability is so great that no reasonable increase
in the interest rate of a loan could compensate for the risk of lending
to borrowers involved with hazardous wastes. Additionally, the costs
of all new commercial mortgages will rise, regardless of the industry
of the borrower, due to the necessity of environmental audits to discover any past contamination of the mortgaged property. Finally,
while creditors may be able to avoid lending to risky industries in the5
future, many lenders already have outstanding loans to such facilities.

77. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558.
78. Id. at 1555-56.
79. The instant court stated that its ruling should "encourage [creditors] to monitor the
hazardous waste treatment systems and policies of their debtors and insist upon compliance
with acceptable treatment standards as a prerequisite to continued and future financial support."
Id. at 1558.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. See Note, supra note 15, at 1295.
83. See Comment, supra note 11, at 178-79.
84. See id.at 182-83.
85. Id. at 179.
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A lender inadvertently may have exposed itself to CERCLA liability
by past financial involvement. If applied, the instant decision may
create enormous liability for lenders who merely attempted to monitor
diligently the financial situation of their borrowers.
The instant court manufactured an opportunity to establish a new

test for lender liability under CERCLA. The court admitted that it
need not even apply its new 'financial management" test to determine
that the appellant in the instant case was liable." Thus, the instant
s
court could have decided the issues before it purely on the facts.Y
However, the court instead chose to use this opportunity to create a
new rule of law.
The instant court recognized that Congress intended to exempt

from CERCLA liability, creditors who hold proof of ownership of a
facility merely to protect their security interest.8 However, the court
construed the exemption narrowly, thereby limiting the type of actions

that a lender can pursue to protect its interest without incurring
cleanup liability. 9 Actions which traditionally have been aspects of a

lender's role in maintaining the financial health of a debtor firm can
now constitute sufficient management participation to create lender
liability. The instant court's decision, based on a questionable interpre-

tation of legislative intent, could be financially devastating to many
lenders.9
Terri Gillis

86. Fleet Factors, 901- F.2d at 1559 n.13.
87. Id. The court noted that evidence showed Fleet controlled disposal of hazardous wastes
at the site. Id.
88. Id. at 1555.
89. See id. at 1558 n.11.
90. On October 1, 1990, in the 1st Session of the 101st Congress, a bill entitled the "Innocent
Lender Liability Relief Act of 1990" was introduced in the House of Representatives by Representatives McDade and Lafalce. H.R. 5764, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). The bill provided in
pertinent part:
Sec. 2. EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY UNDER CERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS.
(a) BUSINESS LOANS.-Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 636(a))
is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
(21)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), in any case in which title or
control of property is acquired by the [Small Business] Administration or by a
financial institution participating with the Administration pursuant to a loan made
or guaranteed under this subsection for a pollution control facility (as such term
is defined in regulations promulgated pursuant to paragraph (12)), neither the
Administration nor the financial institution shall be liable for a violation of any of
the following environmental laws with respect to such property:
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(i) The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.), including liability under section 107 [42 U.S.C.
9607] of that Act.
(B) The exemption from liability provided under subparagraph (A) shall not apply
to the Administration or a financial institution with respect to property described
in subparagraph (A) if the Administration or financial institution, by any act or
omission, caused or contributed to a release or threatened release at such property
of a hazardous substance (in the case of a violation of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980) ....
Id.
Author's Note: H.R. 5764, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. died in session. However, it was reintroduced
as H.R. 1450 in the next session of Congress. At the time this Comment went to publication,
no hearings had yet been held on this bill.
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